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COMMON LAW, COMMON SENSE:
FIDUCIARY STANDARDS AND TRUSTEE IDENTITY
Melanie B. Leslie∗
INTRODUCTION
The past twenty years have seen significant changes in the law
governing trustees’ fiduciary duties. Though fiduciary duty law is a
common law creation, recent changes are not a result of common law
evolution, but legislative action. The push to codify trust law, including
fiduciary duties, has come from several sources, including academics,
who have argued that trust law should be more uniform, and banking
institutions, which have pushed for legislation to ease the burdens of
trust management.
In some significant respects, legislative changes to fiduciary duties
have not improved upon the common law. In fact, a few important
statutes have replaced theoretically sound common law standards with
rules that undermine the historical objectives of trust law. In some
instances, scholars have justified changes by claiming that they are
necessary to protect the non-professional, poorly counseled trustee.
Generally, however, it is the large, institutional trustees that have
benefited—significantly—from the statutory changes in the rules.
In this Article, I argue that recent statutes would be much
improved if they differentiated between professionals and nonprofessional trustees.
There are critical distinctions between
professional and non-professionals: differences in settlors’ expectations
and objectives, negotiation settings, monitoring costs, and the trustees’
responses to liability rules. These distinctions justify having different
fiduciary standards for different types of trustees.
Courts, with their case-specific approach to rules, intuitively
understand that the identity of the trustee should make a difference in
assessing liability for breach of fiduciary duty. Whether expressly or
implicitly, courts gradually have developed two sets of rules. Thus,
∗ Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. For very helpful comments, I
sincerely thank the Indiana University faculty, Robert Sitkoff, Jeffrey Stake, Stewart Sterk,
Edward Halbach, and Jonathan Bell. Marla Decker provided extraordinary assistance with
research.
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changing fiduciary standards to protect the non-professional was never
really necessary.
This is not to say that legislation never takes account of the
differences between professional and non-professional trustees. For
example, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act clearly explains that nonprofessional trustees should be held to a lower standard of care than
professionals, and the delegation rules provide that the status of a
trustee is a critical factor in determining whether the trustee properly
delegated its duties.1 However, trust statutes taken as a whole do not
reflect consistent attention to this issue.
I argue in this Article that considering non-professional trustees
separately from professionals clarifies how fiduciary standards should
be crafted best to meet the objectives of trust law. I consider three
examples: the duty of loyalty, the delegation rules, and the extent to
which the parties to a trust document ought to be permitted to waive or
modify fiduciary protections. In each case, the rules should vary
depending upon the trustee’s identity. In each case, courts have
developed an approach to the issue that appropriately takes the identity
of the trustee into account. But in each case, new statutory approaches
deal with the issue in a less satisfactory way than the common law.
I. CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL
AND NON-PROFESSIONAL TRUSTEES
In determining how fiduciary rules should be fashioned, it is
helpful to first identify some key differences between trusts involving
professional versus non-professional trustees.
The next section
explores, in brief, four key points of difference: the negotiation setting,
settlor objectives and expectations, monitoring abilities, and the degree
to which the trustee is likely to be influenced by the legal rule. It
concludes by setting out separate objectives for governing professional
and non-professional trustees.
A.

Differences in Negotiation Settings

When the settlor engages a professional trustee, the negotiation
process is often characterized by stark information asymmetries.2 On
1
2

UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (a) (1994).
See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,
94 GEO. L.J. 67, 85-88 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees]. Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel, in arguing that fiduciary duties in the corporate setting are, and should be, freely

2006]

COMMON LAW, COMMON SENSE

2715

one hand, the professional trustee is a repeat player and enjoys
economies of scale in understanding what terms are optimal to the
trustee and the legal meaning of those terms.3 The settlor, on the other
hand, may have difficulty understanding the meaning of particular terms
and how those terms may be interpreted in future circumstances.4
In the worst case, the settlor may not be represented by
independent counsel. The settlor may instead work with an investment
advisor that sets up the trust (with a document drafted by its legal
department), explains the document, and then acts as trustee. A trust
provision reducing fiduciary duties or exculpating the trustee is
inconsistent with the essence of the relationship, which is the trustee’s
explicit or implicit promise to exercise the highest degree of care and
skill, and to devote its energies to advancing zealously the beneficiaries’
and not the trustee’s interests.5 The unrepresented settlor, then, may not
expect or detect terms that reduce the trustee’s duties or insulate it from
liability.6 A settlor is even less likely to expect such a term if she has
chosen as trustee a professional with whom she had a pre-existing
relationship when the trust was established, such as her investment
advisor.7
Of course, many prospective settlors are represented by counsel.
This fact, however, may not cure information problems at the margins.
waivable default rules, place great emphasis on market forces that provide information or
compensate for information asymmetries between shareholders and directors. See FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
No comparable market forces exist in the trust context.
3 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 85; cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (1989) (arguing that, in the
corporate context, “uncertainty about operation of the customized term is likely to run against the
prospective shareholder and in favor of the firm” since the firm has greater incentive than the
shareholder to understand how a particular customized charter term will operate).
4 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 85.
5 John Coffee has argued that the asymmetrical information problem exists in the corporate
context, too, and is a critical problem when a shareholder faces a broad waiver of a fiduciary
duty; most shareholders will assume that directors will abide by moral constraints for their own
sake and out of concern for reputation. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989). “[W]hen legal
rules are suspended but nonlegal constraints remain,” he states, “the result is to create
unproductive uncertainty.” Id. at 1669. Coffee argues that a mandatory rule prohibiting a waiver
that would allow departure from moral norms is efficient. Id. at 1669-70.
6 Bogert, disapproving of corporate trustees’ use of exculpatory clauses, notes that the
corporate trustee has “advertis[ed] great skill and ability, and impliedly promised to use all that
care and capacity in any trust where it is chosen trustee.” See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 340
(6th ed. 1987).
7 Indeed the Uniform Trust Code acknowledges as much, imposing on the trustee the burden
of proof that the exculpatory clause inserted by the drafter/trustee is “fair under the
circumstances” and that “its existence and content” are “adequately communicated to the settlor.”
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (2005). However, the UTC goes on to gut the protection that this
standard ostensibly provides by directing that such a provision is presumed to be fair if the settlor
was represented by counsel. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
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Attorneys may be repeat players who seek a stable business relationship
with professional trustees. Increasingly, as commercial banks and
traditional trust companies lose market share to brokerage firms and
other non-traditional trust providers,8 it is the investment advisor who
recommends the attorney who reviews the trust document.9 These
advisors aggressively market trusts to their customers, and are in a
position to deliver a steady stream of clients to cooperative lawyers.10
Although many attorneys will serve their clients ably, those attorneys
who have not fully internalized norms of loyalty and honesty face a
disincentive to argue too vociferously with institutions who wish to
modify fiduciary obligations. This incentive structure has resulted in a
rash of recent cases imposing disciplinary sanctions against lawyers.11
8 See V. Gerard Comizio & Jeffrey L. Hare, Regulatory Developments for Banks and Thrifts
Conducting Trust and Fiduciary Activities, 59 BUS. LAW. 1299 (2004). The authors establish that
“banks have traditionally dominated the trust market, but personal trust services are now being
marketed by a variety of new competitors; as a result, banks have lost market share.” Id. at 1300.
They note that, since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, financial service companies of
all types are increasingly offering trust services. Id.; see also DIVERSIFIED SERVS. GROUP, INC.,
PROSPECTUS: TRUST DISTRIBUTION 2002: BUSINESS & DISTRIBUTION MODELS & TACTICS IN THE
NON-TRADITIONAL TRUST MARKET (2002) (emphasis omitted), http://www.dsgcandr.com/rmreports/trust_2002_dist.html (stating that “the number of depository institutions
with trust powers—and assets under management—decreased by 20.1%” over the three years
ending in 1999); Private Banking . . . Non-Bank Competition Continues to Erode Bank Trust
Marketshare, CONNECTIONS (The LoBue Group, Las Vegas, N.V.), June 1998, available at
http://www.lobue.com/about_us/about_connections.html (stating that banks are experiencing an
“alarming[]” drop in trust business, and that “[s]ince 1990, banks have lost more than half of the
65% market share they once enjoyed”).
9 See, e.g., Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Baker, 492 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa 1992)
(reprimanding attorney for accepting over 100 referrals from financial services company
establishing living trusts and failing to advise clients in a disinterested fashion).
10 See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices—Is
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 115-25 (1984). Professor Johnston explains:
It is a widespread practice among corporate fiduciaries to retain the services of the
lawyer who drafted a will or trust in which a bank is named as executor or trustee to
perform any legal work that may be necessary in estate or trust administration. In
probating a testator’s estate, legal services are virtually always needed because of the
strict application of laws relating to unauthorized practice of law, which preclude
corporate fiduciaries from handling matters processed through the probate court
system. The policy of retaining the draftsman to provide legal services has been
described as a “gentlemen’s agreement” between financial institutions and the bar, as
“reciprocal back scratching,” as a “symbiotic relationship,” and, less generously, as a
“conspiracy” between corporate executors and lawyers to exploit the client by
recommending that the testator name a bank as executor in exchange for assurance that
the executor, once appointed, will retain the attorney to assist in the probate of the
testator’s estate.
Id. at 115 (footnotes omitted).
Although this arrangement appears to give the attorney power over the trustee (because the
trustee wants to induce the attorney to bring it business), it does not seem beyond the pale to
suppose that some attorneys engaged in this type of symbiotic relationship might agree to trust
terms simply to keep the relationship on an even keel.
11 See, e.g., People v. Laden, 893 P.2d 771 (Colo. 1995) (publicly censuring attorney for
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When information problems exist, settlors may agree to trust terms that
are not wealth-enhancing for the trust.
The asymmetrical information problem is less likely to exist when
the settlor chooses as trustee a non-professional associate or family
member. In this situation, the settlor chooses the trustee because the
trustee has a relationship with the settlor and the objects of the settlor’s
bounty, and can be trusted to make discretionary decisions about the
beneficiaries’ respective needs. Neither the trustee nor the attorney, if
any, is a repeat player. Individual trustees of this sort are unlikely to be
trustees of other trusts, are less likely to participate in drafting the trust’s
terms, and are likely to be on a level playing field with the settlor in
terms of sophistication.12 When the settlor chooses a non-professional
trustee, therefore, information problems are unlikely to be significant.
Trust terms that modify fiduciary duties in a specific, narrowly tailored
fashion are likely to be wealth enhancing.
B.

Differences in Monitoring Costs

When the trustee is a professional, monitoring can be quite costly.
With the exception of regulators, the trustee is largely immune from
outside pressures.13
Because trust agreements are private, the
beneficiaries become the sole monitors of the trustee’s behavior. Many
are ill-equipped to read and evaluate complicated financial disclosure
forms, or to second-guess the professional trustee’s investment
decisions.14 Indeed, to evaluate whether the trustee is exercising the
requisite level of care, the beneficiary would need to possess the same
level of expertise and skill as the trustee itself.15 Because breaches of
aiding trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law by issuing standard form advice letters in
response to trust marketer’s clients’ requests for legal advice); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Matias, 521 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1994) (suspending lawyer’s license for accepting
referrals from company that marketed living trusts); In re Mid-Am. Living Trust Assocs., 927
S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1996) (enjoining living trust company, which sold living trust kits to clients and
recommended attorneys to those clients, from doing business in Missouri); Cincinnati Bar Assoc.
v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 2001) (suspending attorney from practicing law for aiding
trust marketer in the unauthorized practice of law and failing to render meaningful legal advice to
trust marketer’s customers).
12 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 87.
13 Fiduciaries are influenced, not just by liability rules, but by social norms. The liability rule
makes no difference to the fiduciary who has internalized the social norm of loyalty, because
loyal behavior is a character trait. When a fiduciary has failed to internalize a norm, then she will
engage in a cost/benefit analysis in considering whether to act disloyally. She will weigh the
chances and consequences of getting caught against the profit she will make if the transaction
goes undetected.
14 See Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 84-85.
15 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J.
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the duty of loyalty often involve trustee self-dealing with closely related
entities, the beneficiary must understand a complex ownership structure
and the identity of the trustee’s many affiliates, and be able to determine
if the trustee’s self-dealing is harmful to the trust.16
Monitoring of the non-professional trustee may be less costly.
Because non-professional trusteeships often arise in the context of
closely-knit family situations, the bonds of love and trust often induce
trustees to perform with care and loyalty. In addition, beneficiaries’
monitoring tasks may be easier: first, close personal relationships give
rise to frequent contact. Moreover, because the non-professional is held
to a lower standard of care, deviation from that standard may be easier
to evaluate.
Finally, the self-dealing transactions of the nonprofessional trustee are generally of a type that are relatively easy to
detect, usually involving trustees who borrow or misappropriate trust
assets.
C.

Differences in the Impact of Liability Rules

Liability rules play an important role in governing the behavior of
professional trustees. Professionals know, or certainly should know, the
substance of the rules that apply to their profession.17 Most are advised
CORP. L. 565, 573 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6,
2003) (recognizing that beneficiaries’ attempts to monitor trustee performance are likely to be
“inefficient if not ineffective” because monitoring efforts will be “wastefully expensive” and
suffer from a lack of information, resources, and necessary knowledge and experience).
16 See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor
John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 559-60 (2005) [hereinafter Leslie, No Further
Inquiry Rule].
17 This is not to say that all professional trustees need the incentive provided by a liability
rule. Fiduciary standards are legal expressions of obligational social norms. Social norms are
standards that are sufficiently ingrained in the culture so that transgression causes self-censure or
condemnation by others. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257 (1999) (explaining obligational norms); id. at 1265-66 (explaining
that fiduciary duties are obligational norms). Eisenberg divides social norms into three
categories: 1) behavioral patterns “that neither entail a sense of obligation nor are self-consciously
adhered to or engaged in”; 2) practices that are “self-consciously engaged in” but “do not involve
a sense of obligation”; and 3) obligational norms, which are “rules or practices that actors not
only self-consciously adhere to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere to or
engage in.” Id. at 1256-57. Eisenberg explains that moral norms are one type of obligational
norm. Id. at 1257. Many, if not most, trustees have internalized these norms; that is, they comply
because it is “the right thing to do,” even if compliance requires them to forego personal gain.
When people have internalized norms, the norms, not legal rules, influence and shape behavior.
Some actors, however, do not internalize particular social norms. For these actors, the
decision whether to transgress entails a cost-benefit analysis, which includes an assessment of the
chance of getting caught and the social and legal penalties that would result. As Cass Sunstein
puts it, “[w]hen defection violates norms, defectors will probably feel shame, an important
motivational force.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium: Law, Economics, & Norms: On the
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by counsel on a regular basis. Non-professional trustees, on the other
hand, probably grasp the broad contours of fiduciary norms; they know
that misappropriating trust funds is wrong, or that failing to pay
attention to investments is problematic. But because they are generally
un-counseled, they are less likely to be aware of the specifics of
particular trust rules. Thus, a change in the legal rule will probably
affect the professional trustee’s behavior, but not the behavior of the
non-professional.
D.

Differences in Settlors’ Objectives

Settlors and trustees cannot draft agreements that accurately
anticipate and resolve all future conflicts.18 When the parties have
failed to stipulate how the trustee should respond to future events,
fiduciary duties provide guidance. Fiduciary duties are best understood
as the terms that the parties would have agreed to ex ante if they had
anticipated the future conflict and bargaining was costless.19
Settlors have different reasons for choosing, and different
expectations about the performance of, professional or non-professional
trustees. Consequently, fiduciary standards should vary depending on
the trustee’s identity.
Settlors choose professionals because they purport to be experts at
managing trust assets and effectuating settlors’ long-term objectives.
For a fee, the expert promises to advocate zealously for the
beneficiaries’ interests and to subordinate the trustee’s interests to those
of the trust. The settlor who chooses the professional trustee expects the
highest level of professionalism and care.
Settlors generally have different motivations for choosing nonprofessional trustees. Settlors choose non-professionals because they
trust their ability to make distribution decisions and deal with family
conflicts. Most settlors expect non-professionals to act in good faith
and to exercise honest judgment; they may not expect non-professional
trustees to possess a professional’s ability to invest or an expert’s
knowledge of the law.
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-30 (1996). Legal rules, therefore,
can play an important role in enforcing compliance with social norms when people have failed to
internalize those norms.
18 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 92; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993).
19 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 92; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at
426; see also Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 577 (positing that “[i]nstead of getting bogged down in the
impossibility of specifying conduct ex ante, fiduciary duties supply liability rules that call for an
‘ex post settling up’ in accordance with what the parties would have bargained for in advance”).
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Ramifications

In sum, when the trustee is a professional, the settlor seeks an
expert level of care and loyalty. Fiduciary rules should encourage that
behavior. Because significant information and monitoring problems
may exist, fiduciary rules for professional trustees should seek to force
disclosure in trust creation and management.
Because non-professionals often will be ignorant of the particulars
of fiduciary rules, such rules will be less likely to affect their behavior.
Rules designed to force disclosure will not achieve their objectives.
Because information and monitoring problems generally are not severe
when the trustee is a non-professional, the rules’ ineffectiveness is not
cause for concern. Instead, rules governing non-professional trustees
should focus more on effectuation of the settlor’s intent.
In the following section, I build on these insights to explore how
fiduciary standards should differ depending on the trustee’s identity.
II. LIABILITY RULES
A.
1.

The Duty of Loyalty

Different Standards for Different Trustees

A trustee breaches its duty of loyalty when it personally profits
from transacting business with the trust.20 As the following sections
demonstrate, the standard for determining trustee liability for such a
breach should vary depending on whether the trustee is a professional or
non-professional. Over time, case law has evolved to take account of
this difference.21 A review of cases from the last decade establishes that
courts generally do not hold non-professional trustees liable for selfdealing acts taken in good faith to benefit the trust.22 Professional
trustees, however, are subject to the no further inquiry rule, which
requires them to obtain advance approval prior to transacting with the

20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmts. c, l (1959).
21 See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text.
22 See cases cited infra note 54.
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trust. In the following sections, I develop an analytical framework to
explain why this doctrinal development is sound.
Unfortunately, the legislatures and drafters of model statutes have
taken a path that is radically different than the courts’ approach. First,
although statutory changes often have been justified as necessary to
protect the non-professional trustee,23 statutes offer non-professionals
no additional protections beyond those that they would receive from
courts. In fact, to the extent that courts interpret new loyalty provisions
as repudiating common law doctrine, statutory changes could leave the
non-professional trustee with even less protection.24 Second, and more
importantly, statutory changes to the duty of loyalty have produced
significant benefits for professional trustees, especially those of the
large institutional type. Although section 8 of the Uniform Trust Code
(the UTC or the “Code”) begins by restating the no further inquiry rule,
it loosens its grip on institutional trustees in sections 802(c)(4) and
802(f), which exempt from the rule most types of self-dealing in which
institutional trustees would seek to engage.25 Instead, institutional
trustees can self-deal without advance approval, and will escape liability
if they can show that the transaction was fair to the trust.26 In many
23 John H. Langbein, Questioning The Trust Law Duty Of Loyalty: Sole Interest Or Best
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005).
24 Specifically, section 802(c)(4) of the Uniform Trust Code, taken literally, codifies the no
further inquiry rule for non-professional trustees who transact with the trust. Although comments
to the UTC indicate that the common law remains in effect, courts in adopting states might decide
that the new statute should be applied according to its plain language.
25 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b) (2005) states that “a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction
involving the investment or management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the
trustee’s own personal account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s
fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary . . . ,” whereas section 802(c)(4)
states that:
[a] sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or management of
trust property is presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary
interests if it is entered into by the trustee with: . . . (4) a corporation or other person or
enterprise in which the trustee, or a person that owns a significant interest in the
trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment.
Section 802(f) provides:
An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust
to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee
is not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if
the investment complies with the prudent investor rule of [Article] 9. The trustee may
be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those
services out of fees charged to the trust if the trustee at least annually notifies the
persons entitled under Section 813 to receive a copy of the trustee’s annual report of
the rate and method by which the compensation was determined.
26 The comment to UTC section 802 states:
Under subsection (c), a transaction between a trustee and certain relatives and business
associates is presumptively voidable, not void. Also presumptively voidable are
transactions with corporations or other enterprises in which the trustee, or a person who
owns a significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s
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states, the UTC’s adoption has repealed, or is poised to repeal, statutes
that expressly required trustees to obtain advance approval prior to selfdealing.27 The UTC relieves institutional trustees of the burden of
making full disclosure ex ante, and places the burden of detecting and
objecting to the self-dealing behavior squarely on the beneficiary.
In the following paragraphs, I explain the no further inquiry rule
and show why it continues to serve an important function with respect
to professional trustees. I also argue that replacing the no further
inquiry rule with corporate law’s “best interests” defense is unwise
because significant differences between the corporate and trust law
settings require different rules. Finally, I analyze whether the no further
inquiry rule is equally appropriate for non-professional trustees, and
conclude that it may be inappropriate. I also establish that my analysis
is descriptive as well as normative: in recent decades, case law has
evolved to create different liability rules for professional and nonprofessional trustees who self-deal. Finally, I turn to recently enacted
statues, including the UTC, and explore how those statutes should be
amended to be consistent with my analytical framework.
a.

Professional Trustees and the No Further Inquiry Rule

best judgment. The presumption is rebutted if the trustee establishes that the
transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests.
Among the factors tending to rebut the presumption are whether the consideration was
fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are similar to those that would be
transacted with an independent party.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2005) (emphasis added).
27 The Uniform Trustee Powers Act (U.T.P.A.) states, “[i]f the duty of the trustee and his
individual interest, or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust
power, the power may be exercised only by court authorization.” UNIF. TRUSTEE POWERS ACT §
5 (1964). Although not widely adopted, of the sixteen states that adopted the U.T.P.A., ten have
since adopted the UTC, repealing this provision of the U.T.P.A. The following states adopted the
Uniform Trustee Powers Act in full or a substantially similar version: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-7235 (2005)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.403 (West 2006)), Hawaii (HAW. REV.
STAT. § 554A-5 (2004)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-108 (2005)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN.
58-1201 to 11 (repealed 2002)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.820 (West 2006)), Maine
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, § 7-404 (repealed 2003)), Michigan (MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. §
700.7403 (West 2006)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-111 (2006)), Nebraska (NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-2819 to 26 (repealed 2002)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-A:1 to
A:11 (repealed 2004)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §45-7-401 (repealed 2003)); OR. REV.
STAT. § 128.003 to .051 (repealed 2005)), South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-706 (2005)),
Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-401 to 409 (2005)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-8-101
to 4-8-1122 (repealed 2003)). Florida, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming all have since adopted the UTC. See Unif. Law
Comm’rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utc2000.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
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Trust law has long imposed a bright-line prohibition against trustee
self-dealing.28 Historically, a trustee could profit from its position only
if the settlor had expressly authorized it or if the trustee had obtained
authorization to act from the court or the beneficiaries.29 Any
unauthorized transaction involving the trust and the trustee personally
constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty and was voidable by the
beneficiary, even if the trustee’s action did not damage the trust.30
When the trustee engaged in self-dealing, the beneficiaries were entitled
to choose among a variety of remedies: in addition to rescinding the
transaction, beneficiaries could seek damages or, more importantly,
require the trustee to pay all of its profits to the trust.31 Beneficiaries
could also seek to have the trustee removed.32
This clear rule prohibiting the trustee’s personal interaction with
the trust was known as the “no further inquiry rule.” The rule’s unique
feature was its strict liability aspect: the trustee had no defense. In
marked contrast to corporate law, the trustee was held liable even if the
transaction was fair to the trust or in the trust’s best interests. The rule
was equally applicable to transactions that benefited third persons
whose interests were intermingled with the trustee’s.33 The trustee was
prohibited from engaging in transactions with her close family members
or firms in which she had an interest.34 Historically, professional trust
companies could not transact business with related firms.35
There is little doubt that the move away from the no further inquiry
rule has been influenced by a similar trend in corporate law.36 Although
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmts. a, l (1959). The most recent
preliminary draft of the Restatement (Third) affirms the Restatement (Second)’s approach to the
duty of loyalty in the main, but recognizes (and thus seems to validate) a troubling new loophole
for institutional trustees that threatens to undermine the duty of loyalty. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (affirming the duty of loyalty
generally); id. cmt. c(8) (noting that state statutes allow institutional trustees to invest trust assets
in proprietary mutual funds).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (stating
that the “duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by comparison to the standards of
other fiduciary relationships”).
30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2003) (stating
that under the no further inquiry rule “it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the
action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no
profit resulted to the trustee”).
31 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170.2, 206 (1939); BOGERT, supra
note 6, § 95.
32 BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.
33 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31,
§§ 170.6, 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31,
§§ 170.6, 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.
35 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmts. c, d, h, i (1992); SCOTT, supra note 31,
§§ 170.10, 170.11, 170.13; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.
36 Langbein, supra note 23.
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at the turn of the twentieth century self-interested transactions were
voidable by shareholders,37 the rule soon evolved to allow directors or
management to escape liability for breach of the duty of loyalty by
showing that the transaction was “fair to” or “in the best interests of”
the corporation.38 Leaving aside the issue of whether the change in
corporate law was a good one, the trust mechanism is distinct from a
corporation in ways that explain why trust law stubbornly held on to the
no further inquiry rule long after corporate law abolished it. In the
following paragraphs, I explain why the no further inquiry rule is
superior to the best interests defense as a liability rule for professional
trustees.
There are two key differences between the no further inquiry rule
and the best interests defense. The first difference is in the monitoring
costs created by each rule. The second concerns the impact that each
rule has on supporting social norms.
i.

Monitoring Costs

Because beneficiaries and shareholders often detect duty of loyalty
violations only after the fact, deterrence of disloyal behavior depends on
the ease with which the beneficiaries or shareholders can hold the
fiduciary liable. The best interests defense creates significantly greater
costs for beneficiaries/shareholders, and thus provides less of a
deterrent, than the no further inquiry rule.39
The no further inquiry rule puts the burden of exposing the
conflict, providing information, and making the case that the transaction
is in the trust’s best interests squarely on the fiduciary.40 The
beneficiary’s monitoring tasks are limited to evaluating the information
before her and monitoring to ensure that the fiduciary is not benefiting
from its position of trust without advance approval. The latter task
requires only that the beneficiary determine whether the trustee or a

37 See Deborah A. DeMott, The Figure in the Landscape: A Comparative Sketch of Directors’
Self-Interested Transactions, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 252-53 (1999) (noting that “any
contract between a director and the corporation [was] voidable at the corporation’s insistence”
and that later, “courts may have believed that substantive judicial review [was] more likely to
detect problematic transactions than [was] submission to shareholders”).
38 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41 (1981) (providing that an interested transaction can be
validated if it is “fair and reasonable to the corporation”); see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations §
1504 (2006) (noting that although some statutes recognize the validity of a board resolution
approving a self-interested transaction, such transactions may be avoided if they are “unfair and
unreasonable to the corporation”); id. § 1738 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 41 (1969)).
39 See Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 554-67.
40 Id. at 564.
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related company has a personal interest in a transaction with the trust.
If so, the beneficiary has a claim for breach.
By contrast, the best interests defense imposes significantly greater
monitoring costs on the beneficiary/shareholder.41 Because the rule
does not require advance approval, trustees seldom will present
beneficiaries with the information the beneficiaries need to evaluate
self-dealing transactions. The beneficiary must not only detect selfdealing transactions, but also expend resources gathering information to
evaluate them. Because this rule does not impose automatic liability,
the beneficiary’s monitoring task is further increased: she must evaluate
the transaction to determine whether a court would likely find that the
transaction is fair to the corporation.
In the corporate context, a rule that is more costly in terms of
monitoring expenses may not be troubling because market forces
support and supplement shareholders’ monitoring efforts.42 Strong
information markets exist, and fiduciaries’ performance is reflected, in
some measure, in stock price.43 More importantly, shareholders can
monitor collectively––some number of shareholders will be financially
sophisticated, and large institutional investors have strong incentives to
monitor fiduciary performance.44 Small investors can free ride on those
efforts.45 If a particular board member or officer wishes to engage in
self-dealing, other board members have an incentive to scrutinize the
deal to make sure it is fair to the corporation. As a result, significant,
unauthorized self-dealing is often detected. All of these forces together
pressure corporate fiduciaries to conform to fiduciary standards.
By contrast, professional trustees face little to no market
pressure.46 Trust documents and management decisions are private, and
neither information markets nor share prices evaluate trustee
performance. The entire task of monitoring falls on a few beneficiaries,
41
42

Id. at 565.
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 21 (stating that if corporate charters
contain disadvantageous terms, “management will pay as investors go elsewhere”); Gordon,
supra note 3, at 1563-65 (arguing that stock price does telegraph information about charter
terms); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 33-45 (1990) (arguing that markets are efficient and
that corporate terms are fully reflected in stock price, and concluding that “the presence of play in
the corporate contract suggests, rather than a failure of contracting, a recognition that the least
costly way of dealing with agency costs may be to allow them to be checked by incentive or
monitoring devices instead of by liability rules”).
43 See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 42, at 33-45.
44 Id.
45 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 18-22 (stating that “the price of stocks traded
in public markets is established by professional investors, not by amateurs” and, drawing on other
academic literature, arguing that stock price reflects the value of charter terms, which protects
uninformed investors); see also Gordon, supra note 3, at 1558-59.
46 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 82-84.
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who must bear a greater proportionate share of the monitoring costs
than shareholders bear. In addition, it is probably a safe generalization
to say that beneficiaries as a whole are poorer monitors than
shareholders. Many beneficiaries lack financial acumen, and there is
nothing equivalent to the institutional investor on which the less
sophisticated beneficiary can free ride. Thus, the trust context presents
significantly less monitoring, and poorer quality monitoring, than does
the corporate context.47 Because of this disparity, a rule that places the
burden of disclosure on the trustee makes more sense than one that
places it on the beneficiary.
ii.

The Impact of Liability Rules

The monitoring difficulties inherent in the trust context make it
less likely that a fiduciary’s opportunistic behavior will be detected. It
is therefore more important that the liability rule create the strongest
possible deterrent to disloyal behavior. The no further inquiry rule
sends the clearest possible message to trustees:48 do not profit from your
position without obtaining advance approval.49 The remedies afforded
by the rule are designed to make the stakes for breaching high—the
trustee who stands to lose profits and face removal might think twice
before engaging in self-dealing. In many states, the advance approval
doctrine has also been codified, which provides even clearer warnings.50
The corporate standard, on the other hand, sends a murkier
message. When some types of opportunism are allowed, fiduciaries,
particularly those who have not internalized social norms of loyalty,
may push the boundaries of allowable behavior or rationalize behavior
that is clearly questionable. In the corporate context, where market
discipline is stronger, this fuzziness may not be as troubling. When
monitoring is lacking, it is unwise. Thus, the no further inquiry rule is
the best rule to apply to professional trustees.

47 For a discussion on the differences in the monitoring capabilities of beneficiaries and
shareholders, see Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2, at 77-88.
48 The clearer the rule, the easier it is transmitted and understood. See Error! Main Document

Only.Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
49 As Robert Cooter and Bradley Friedman note, “[t]he duty of loyalty must be understood as
the law’s attempt to create an incentive structure in which the fiduciary’s self-interest directs her
to act in the best interest of the beneficiary.” See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Friedman, The
Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1074 (1991).
50 See supra note 27.
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The Non-Professional Trustee’s Duty of Loyalty

Historically, the no further inquiry rule applied equally to
professional and non-professional trustees, at least in theory. A strong
case can be made, however, that the rule is an inappropriate liability
rule for non-professional trustees. First, beneficiaries’ monitoring tasks
may be less costly: because non-professional trusteeships often arise in
the context of closely knit family situations, love, affection, and trust
often do the work that market pressures perform in the corporate setting.
Close personal relationships also give rise to frequent contact. More
importantly, the self-dealing transactions of the non-professional trustee
are of a type that are relatively easy to detect, usually involving trustees
who borrow or misappropriate trust assets. This is in contrast to selfdealing transactions by corporate trustees, which often involve
transactions between the trust and various corporate entities in which
the corporate trustee has an interest. To detect self-dealing in this case,
the beneficiary must understand a complex ownership structure and the
identity of the trustee’s many affiliates in addition to detecting the
transaction.51
Another factor justifying an exception for non-professional trustees
is the fact that non-professionals generally lack knowledge of the no
further inquiry rule. Unlike a professional trustee, which should be
expected to understand the liability rules governing its profession, the
non-professional may receive inadequate or no legal advice.52 Imposing
liability or other sanctions against a trustee whose actions were taken in
good faith and fair to the trust furthers neither the settlor’s nor the no
further inquiry rule’s objectives: Most settlors expect good faith and
honest judgment, but not an expert’s knowledge of the law. Moreover,
holding non-professionals strictly liable does not advance the rule’s
objectives of creating the strongest possible deterrent to self-dealing; the
rule cannot deter those who are unaware of it.53
In addition, a significant number of trusts with non-professional
trustees are family trusts that create a built-in conflict of interest
between the trustee’s fiduciary obligations and personal interests. For
example, a settlor may create a by-pass or credit-shelter trust, naming
her spouse as trustee and income beneficiary with limited rights to
51
52
53

Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 559.
Langbein, supra note 23, at 963.
For a discussion and examples of alternate reading of case law, see Leslie, No Further
Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 554 (“These cases provide peculiar evidence of overdeterrence,
because the trustees were not deterred; they simply engaged in self-dealing without obtaining
advance approval. That is, these cases involved trustees who did not know the law, and who
would not have responded to incentives.”).
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principal distributions, and her children as remaindermen. Or, a settlor
might devise shares of a family-owned corporation in trust to benefit his
descendants, and name a child who controls the company as trustee with
the power to vote the trust’s shares. In these situations, that the trustee
will take actions that benefit herself is practically guaranteed; applying
the no further inquiry rule to impose liability when the trustee does not
understand the need to obtain advance approval surely would frustrate
the settlor’s intent.

2.

Common Law, Common Sense

The case can be made, then, that non-professional trustees should
be judged differently than professionals when they transact with the
trust without obtaining advance approval. Increasingly, courts are
recognizing as much. A review of case law over the past decade
establishes that not one court has removed a non-professional trustee or
imposed personal liability for self-dealing without advance approval
when the trustee’s self-interested transaction was a good faith attempt to
benefit the trust and effectuate the settlor’s objectives.54 On the other
hand, courts find that trustees have breached their duty of loyalty when
a reasonable person should have known that the self-dealing act would
54 See Beattie v. J.M Tull Found., No. 97-2746, 1999 WL 222406 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 1999)
(reversing district court to hold that trustee who, in good faith, cashed out life insurance policies
and distributed them to his incapacitated aunt, thereby increasing her estate that he inherited and
depleting remaindermen’s share, did not breach duty of loyalty because trustee was attempting to
carry out settlor’s intent); Tays v. Metler, No. 97-2317, 1999 WL 149661 (10th Cir. Mar. 19,
1999) (holding that husband/trustee of by-pass trust did not breach duty of loyalty when he sold
his personal property to the trust for cash, because his actions were in good faith and were
consistent with settlor’s purpose in establishing the by-pass trust); Helman v. Mendelson, 769
A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (declining to remove family trustees who borrowed money
from the trust because the transactions were fair, trustees acted in good faith, and they repaid the
loans); Massara v. Henery, No. 19646, 2000 WL 1729457 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000)
(affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of two family trustees who sold the
beneficiary’s interest in the family business back to family partnership (of which trustees were
partners), without beneficiary’s consent, in exchange for the partnership’s promise to pay to the
trust a fixed sum over six years because trustees were motivated by a desire to guarantee the
beneficiary a steady income and to prevent him from obtaining additional funds from the trust to
fuel his drug habit); Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2000) (reversing appellate
court’s application of the no further inquiry rule to find that trustee/son who voted trust’s shares
to preserve his control over family corporation did not breach his duty of loyalty to trust
beneficiaries). But cf. Kinzel v. Kinzel, C.A. No. 95CA006122, 1996 WL 121997 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 20, 1996) (holding that trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of trustee,
where trustee held proceeds from sale of trust property in trustee’s personal bank account, and
remanding for a determination whether this act constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty; a
proper application of the no further inquiry rule would have eliminated the need for remand to
consider the fairness of the transaction, and would have resulted in automatic liability).

2006]

COMMON LAW, COMMON SENSE

2729

not benefit the trust.55 Although courts are not always clear about what
standard they are applying, several courts have expressly rejected
beneficiaries’ arguments that the no further inquiry rule should apply to
non-professional trustees.56 Indeed, research indicates that in the past
decade only two appellate courts have approved the application of the
no further inquiry rule to a non-professional trustee––and in neither of
those cases did the trustee suffer personal liability or removal for the
mere fact of self-dealing.57
55 For example, in Feinberg v. Adolph K. Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996), the trustee remaindermen, sons of the settlor, failed to make significant income
distributions to their mother, the income beneficiary, and almost entirely depleted the trust corpus
by making themselves unsecured loans on extraordinarily favorable terms (on which they
defaulted) in order to fund their business ventures. In addition to awarding damages, the court
directed the trustees to pay the income beneficiary’s attorney’s fees. See also Sanford v. Sanford,
355 Ark. 274 (2003) (holding that husband/trustee breached duty to ex-wife beneficiary when he
took unauthorized trustee compensation and sold trust property and kept her share of the proceeds
to repay her alleged debts to him, which left her with no funds to pay capital gains tax); Hosey v.
Burgess, 319 Ark. 183 (1995) (trustee/remainderman breached duty by subleasing trust property
and keeping the profit); Sullivan v. Hellgren, No. B164017, 2004 WL 831178 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2004) (finding trustee/beneficiary breached duty to brother/beneficiary by transferring family
home from trust to herself, selling the home, keeping the proceeds, and rendering the trust
worthless); White v. Pierson-Anderson (In re Estate of Heyn), 47 P.3d 724 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)
(stating that when the beneficiary can show self-dealing, the trustee can rebut the charge by
showing that the transaction was fair and reasonable, and finding trustee liable because he lived
rent-free in the apartment building that was held in trust); Aiello v. Hyland, 793 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding damages and removing trustee who attempted to sell trust
property at below-market value to brother with whom trustee was in business); Deutsch v. Wolff,
994 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1999) (upholding determination that trustee was liable on an outstanding
loan from trust to partnership in which trustee and one beneficiary were partners); John R. Boyce
Family Trust v. Snyder, 128 S.W.3d 630 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding trustee liable for breach of
fiduciary duty because he convinced beneficiary to consent to the use of trust assets to buy a store
from trustee by misrepresenting his reasons for selling and the store’s financial position; store
went bankrupt); Coffey v. Coffey, 286 N.J. Super. 42 (App. Div. 1995) (finding settlor/trustee of
trust for divorced settlor’s children liable for breach of duty of loyalty when he improperly used
trust assets to satisfy his personal financial obligations to his children, used trust funds to pay his
legal bills, and co-mingled trust assets with his own); In re Dentler Family Trust, 873 A.2d 738
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (surcharging co-trustees (settlor’s son and his lawyer) for, among other
things, trading trust assets on margin to raise cash in order to make a large distribution to trustee’s
son at the expense of the other trust beneficiaries).
56 See, e.g., Tays, 1999 WL 149661 (following the law of several states to hold that when
settlor created the conflict of interest between trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests, the
trustee is liable for breach only when acting in bad faith, dishonestly, or intentionally against the
interest of the trust); Helman, 769 A.2d at 1051-52 (rejecting beneficiary’s claim that the no
further inquiry rule should apply when trustee loaned himself trust funds); Massara, 2000 WL
1729457 (holding that the no further inquiry was inapplicable and placing the burden on the
beneficiary to show that he was damaged by the trustee’s action); Warehime, 563 Pa. 400
(holding that the appellate court erred as a matter of law in applying the no further inquiry rule
because a “good faith” standard was more appropriate).
57 See Stegemeier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557 (Del. 1999) (indicating trustees who sold real
property held in trust to themselves, developed it, and sold it at a profit might be found not liable
on remand so long as they could demonstrate that they paid fair market value, which, as the
dissent pointed out, seemed likely given that trustee’s expert trial witness already provided
significant evidence in support of that fact); In re Estate of Stevenson, 605 N.W.2d 818 (S.D.

2730

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

In sum, courts are protecting non-professional trustees from
liability when doing so effectuates settlors’ intent and does not
undermine the deterrent effect of the no further inquiry rule. Yet the no
further inquiry rule, with its advance approval requirement, is the
appropriate rule for professional trustees. Unfortunately, as I establish
in the following sections, statutes enacted in recent years fail to address
the need for different rules.

3.

Statutory Shortcomings

As we have seen, case law is evolving to create two distinct
liability rules for professional and non-professional trustees. The past
twenty years have seen a surge of interest in codifying the law of trusts.
Insofar as codification restates and integrates the common law, it
presents few problems. Some key statutes codifying the duty of loyalty,
however, significantly depart from, and in some instances entirely
repudiate, settled duty of loyalty principles. In particular, statutory
departures from the no further inquiry rule create significant benefits for
the professional trustee at the expense of the beneficiary, and fail to
reflect changes in the case law that protect the non-professional. More
troubling, no one has given a persuasive justification for either problem.
a.

Uniform Trust Code Section 802 and Exceptions to the No Further
Inquiry Rule

Section 802 of the UTC, the duty of loyalty provision, could be
significantly improved by giving greater attention to the differences
between professional and non-professional trustees. First, a quibble: the
Code arguably could afford more protection to the non-professional
trustee than it currently does.
The comments appropriately
acknowledge the plight of the inherently conflicted non-professional
trustee and suggest that a settlor’s appointment of a conflicted trustee
may constitute an implied waiver of the duty of loyalty.58 However, a

2002) (applying no further inquiry rule, and allowing beneficiaries to void trustee’s leases of trust
property to trustee’s husband and to trustee’s husband’s relatives; trustee suffered no personal
liability).
58 Presumably, the comments mean to suggest that a conflicted trustee’s acts should be
judged by a “best interest of the trust” standard, and not that a conflicted trustee’s self-interested
acts are per se valid.
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non-conflicted non-professional who transacts business directly with the
trust without advance approval may be subject to the no further inquiry
rule,59 which the Code affirms is applicable to all trustees except as
otherwise provided.60 Of course, there is a good reason to set out the no
further inquiry rule as the black letter law applicable to all trustees: if a
non-professional trustee consults a lawyer prior to engaging in a
conflicted transaction, it is best if the lawyer advises her to seek
advance approval. However, because the statute seems clear on its face,
some courts might read it as a repudiation of cases that apply a “best
interests” test to actions taken by non-professional trustees. The
comments could clarify that the statute does not abrogate common law
doctrine.
More troubling, section 802(c) creates an enormous exception from
the no further inquiry rule for professional trustees, one that represents a
reversal of the common law. The ill-advised loophole seems to be an
extension of case law that existed to protect individual trustees.
Because the exception makes sense only in the case of nonprofessionals, the extension to benefit professional trustees is
unwarranted.
Specifically, the model statute lists a variety of transactions that
give rise to only a rebuttable presumption of improper self-dealing. The
trustee may rebut the presumption of self-dealing by establishing that
“the transaction was not affected by a conflict between personal and
fiduciary interests.”61 In determining whether the trustee has met its
burden, the court may consider factors such as “whether the
consideration was fair and whether the other terms of the transaction are
similar to those that would be transacted with an independent party.”62

59
60

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2005).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) & (b) (2005) provide:
(a) A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
(b) Subject to the rights of persons dealing with or assisting the trustee as provided in
Section 1012, a sale, encumbrance, or other transaction involving the investment or
management of trust property entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own personal
account or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary and
personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless:
(1) the transaction was authorized by the terms of the trust;
(2) the transaction was approved by the court;
(3) the beneficiary did not commence a judicial proceeding within the time
allowed by Section 1005;
(4) the beneficiary consented to the trustee’s conduct, ratified the transaction, or
released the trustee in compliance with Section 1009; or
(5) the transaction involves a contract entered into or claim acquired by the
trustee before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee.
61 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 cmt. (2005).
62 Id.
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Thus, for particular transactions, the statute replaces the no further
inquiry rule with what is essentially a corporate “fairness” standard.
Those transactions include transactions between the trustee and 1) the
trustee’s spouse, 2) the trustee’s relatives, 3) the trustee’s agents and
attorneys, and 4) “a corporation or other person or enterprise in which
the trustee, or a person that owns a significant interest in the trustee, has
an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment.”63 Only
exception two has significant, though not solid, support in the common
law.64 Exception one, which finds some support in case law, can be
justified as a logical extension of exception two. The comments are
silent as to why exceptions were made for the employees, agents, and
affiliates of professional trustees.
One possibility is that the drafters simply viewed exceptions three
and four as natural extensions of the “indirect self-dealing” rule
articulated by Austin Wakeman Scott. According to Scott,
the mere fact that the purchaser [of trust property] is related to the
trustee is not of itself a sufficient ground for voiding the sale. It is,
however, a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the
sale was made in the best interests of the beneficiaries and if on all
the facts it appears that the trustee sold the property for less than he
could have obtained from others or otherwise abused his discretion
in making the sale, the trustee is guilty of a breach of trust . . . .65

The cases that Scott cites as support involve non-professional
family trustees or executors who sold trust property to relatives to
benefit the estate or trust. This exception to the no further inquiry rule,
to the extent it existed,66 is best understood as courts’ attempt to protect
the non-professional family fiduciary who dealt fairly with the testator’s
estate or trust but neglected to obtain advance approval. It is consistent
with the idea that the no further inquiry rule should not be applied when
doing so would violate the settlor’s intent. The exception cannot,
however, serve as a basis for shielding professional trustees from
liability when they deal with employees, or with related entities in
which they have a significant interest.
To the extent the Code’s exceptions benefit professional trustees,
they are unsound. First, the rule eliminates incentives for professional
trustees to bargain with settlors for authorization to deal with related
63
64

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(c)(4) (2005).
SCOTT, supra note 31, § 170.6; BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95. There are some courts that
recognize the spouse exception, however others have soundly rejected it.
65 SCOTT, supra note 31, § 170.6.
66 Bogert rejected the idea that these transactions are exempt from the no further inquiry rule,
stating “[t]he rule against self-dealing extends to transactions with a firm of which the trustee is a
member, a corporation in which he has a controlling or substantial interest, and with a spouse,
agents, employees and other persons whose interests are closely identified with those of the
trustee.” BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95.
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entities. Second, the rule greatly increases beneficiaries’ monitoring
costs; it creates a disincentive for trustees to disclose the details of the
transaction to the beneficiaries before the fact because failure to do so
does not constitute a breach of duty. As a result, beneficiaries must
ferret out all self-dealing.
Moreover, the UTC rule increases beneficiaries’ litigation burden,
and in so doing weakens the law’s role as a deterrent to self-dealing.
Instead of limiting beneficiaries’ burden to determining whether the
trustee is transacting with affiliates, the rule requires beneficiaries to
evaluate the transaction in question to determine whether a court will
find the transaction was affected by a conflict of interest. This means
the beneficiary must understand and evaluate alternative choices the
trustee might have made and determine whether a court will likely find
that the transaction was “fair,” a dubious enterprise which the no further
inquiry rule eliminated. Moreover, because the trustee will not face
liability as long as the transaction was fair, the UTC rule eliminates an
important incentive the no further inquiry rule created: the incentive to
advocate zealously for the trust. After all, why should the trustee
expend additional effort to get the best deal for the trust if the trustee
will not be held liable for settling for a transaction that is simply fair
and that also generates benefits for the trustee’s affiliates? Finally, the
exception for professional trustees is not required on grounds of
fairness. Surely professionals should know the law requiring them to
obtain approval before transacting with related businesses.
Because institutional trustees increasingly are merged with or
related to other types of banking and investment institutions,67 almost
all of the self-dealing in which they would be tempted to engage
involves an affiliate. For institutional trustees, then, the exception set
forth in section 802(c)(4) swallows the no further inquiry rule whole,
creating significant costs for beneficiaries. No compelling reason exists
for displacing the no further inquiry rule’s thoughtful incentive structure
with a rebuttable presumption.
b. Statutes That Authorize Trustees to Invest in
Proprietary Mutual Funds
In the past fifteen years, the vast majority of states have enacted
statutes providing that a trustee’s investment in proprietary mutual
funds is not a breach of the duty of loyalty,68 even though the trustee’s
67
68

See Leslie, No Further Inquiry Rule, supra note 16, at 573-74.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.90.010 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-71-104 (2004); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 16015 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-8-2 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 412:8-
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related or parent company collects commissions and fees in its capacity
as an investment bank. It is important to emphasize that, unlike section
802(c) of the UTC, which creates a rebuttable presumption of breach,
these statutes create no presumption at all. As long as the investment is
consistent with the prudent investor rule, the trustee has not breached a
duty.
These statutes do not compensate for information asymmetries in
the negotiation process. They completely reverse the centuries-old
common law rule, and require a settlor to bargain for the protection the
duty of loyalty formerly provided. If the settlor’s lawyer fails to inform
the settlor of this issue out of a desire to obtain repeat business from the
trust company, the settlor probably will not understand that the trust
agreement creates an incentive for the trustee to invest in its own
investments instead of others that might better serve the trust.
In addition, these statutes dramatically increase beneficiaries’
monitoring costs. They remove all incentive for the trustee to make full
disclosure to the beneficiary prior to transacting. They require the
beneficiary to determine whether the proprietary mutual funds managed
by the trustee, or the trustee’s affiliate, are sufficiently inferior to other
funds to constitute proof that “the trustee . . . place[d] its own interests
ahead of those of the beneficiaries.” If the investment does seem
substandard, the beneficiary’s litigation burdens will be greater: instead
of disposing of the liability issue on summary judgment, as the no
further inquiry rule would, the new statutes will require a trial to
determine whether the trustee breached its duty.
Finally, statutes permitting trustees to invest trust assets in their
own mutual funds fail to create the maximum incentives for trustees to
work zealously to advance the trust’s best interests. A trustee need no
longer subordinate its interests to those of the trust. Instead, it can profit
from its position as trustee as long as the conflicted investment is “good
enough.”
A few state statutes take monitoring problems more seriously, and
require the trustee to obtain beneficiaries’ consent to such activity in
writing,69 or, best of all, force trustees to choose between earning trustee
commissions or mutual fund commissions.70 Many statutes mitigate
400 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-404A (2004); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/5.2 (2004); IND.
CODE § 28-1-12-3 (1998); IOWA CODE 633.123A (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.020 (West
2006); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-106 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
487.14405 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 362.550 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 709.175 (2003);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-302 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §
75-7-402 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.035 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-9
(LexisNexis 2004); WIS. STAT. § 881.01 (2003-2004).
69 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3205 (2005).
70 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, § 7-408 (1997); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 112.2 (McKinney 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.55 (West 1997).
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monitoring problems slightly by requiring the trustee to provide a
statement explaining how its commissions were calculated. The UTC,
in section 802(f), adopts the approach of these states.
These statutes, however, do not go far enough. A far better
approach would be to require trustees to obtain settlor or beneficiary
approval in writing, and to impose on trustees the burden to prove that
they made full disclosure. This would telegraph to the settlor or
beneficiary the need to renegotiate trustee commissions.
In sum, these statutes discourage disclosure, increase monitoring
costs, and fail to encourage professional trustees to get the best deal for
the trust. It is difficult to attribute this sea change in the law to anything
other than effective lobbying by banks.

B.
1.

Delegation Rules

Different Rules for Different Trustees

Another area of trust law that has been reversed in recent years is
non-delegation doctrine. Prior to the mid 1990s, black letter law
prohibited a trustee from delegating any function the trustee could
“reasonably be required personally to perform.”71 If the trustee properly
delegated to an agent who thereafter damaged the trust, the trustee was
liable only if it had been negligent in choosing and supervising the
agent. If the trustee made an improper delegation, however, it was
liable for all damage caused to the trust by the agent.
Historically, courts viewed the trustee’s investment function as an
act that the trustee was “reasonably . . . required personally to perform.”
Thus, trustees that delegated that function were held personally liable
when the investment agent caused losses to the trust. Over time, as
investing increased in complexity, academics and practitioners alike
argued that the prohibition on delegation of the investment function
should be reversed. Allowing trustees to delegate investment decisions,
they argued, would better serve beneficiaries’ interests by ensuring that
trust assets were invested in accordance with professional standards.
Reversing the doctrine also would assist the settlor who preferred to
appoint a family member as trustee but was hesitant to do so because of
that individual’s lack of investing expertise.72 Finally, some argue that
71
72

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L.
REV. 105, 106, 110 (1994) [hereinafter Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule]; UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 cmt. (1994); John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act
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the non-delegation rule hurts only those beneficiaries serviced by nonprofessional trustees with no investment experience because, unlike
their professional counterparts, these trustees would not be savvy
enough to draft around the rule.73
Undoubtedly, a rule flatly prohibiting all trustees from delegating
investment functions is unwise. Yet reversing the non-delegation rule
raises another set of questions. First, what limits, if any, should be
placed on a trustee’s power to delegate? Second, how does a trustee’s
delegation of the investment function affect its fiduciary duties to trust
beneficiaries? Third, should the trustee’s agents owe fiduciary duties
directly to the trust beneficiaries? I argue in the following section that
the answers to these questions should depend on whether the trustee is a
professional or a non-professional.
a.

Delegation and the Professional Trustee

This Article has established that background rules for professional
trustees should create strong incentives to 1) provide full information to
settlors during the trust creation process and craft any modifications of
fiduciary rules narrowly and specifically, 2) provide full and fair
disclosure to beneficiaries prior to deviating from the settlor’s
reasonable expectations, and 3) perform to the highest level of
professional standards consistent with the settlor’s intent. A rule that
allows professional trustees to delegate the investment function should
reflect those objectives.
When a professional trustee properly delegates, what implications
should that have with respect to the trustee’s continued liability to the
beneficiaries? There are three options: 1) a rule that relieves the trustee
from all liability if the agent harms the trust, 2) a rule that holds the
trustee liable only if its failure to carefully select and supervise the
agent contributes to the trust’s losses, or 3) a rule that makes the trustee
liable for losses caused by its agent. The first option is unwise for
obvious reasons. In the following paragraphs, I argue that professional
trustees should be held liable for the acts of their investment agents,
regardless of whether the trustee is negligent in choosing or supervising
that agent. This background rule would best effectuate the settlor’s
intentions and address the problems inherent in the professional trustee
context.
First, a strict liability rule is probably the rule the settlor would
have agreed to if he had thought about the issue during the drafting
process. The settlor chose the trustee largely because of its expertise in
and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 650 (1996).
73 Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 109-10.
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trust management. Presumably, then, the settlor would expect the
trustee to delegate the investment function only in rare instances.74 A
strict liability rule pressures trustees to delegate only when doing so
would make the beneficiaries better off, but does not inhibit necessary
delegation—if the trustee knows it lacks the skills to handle particular
investment duties, delegating will be a superior choice to not delegating,
even if the trustee will face liability for the agent’s acts. The rule
creates incentives to use maximum care in selecting and monitoring an
agent, and protects the beneficiaries from being harmed through no fault
of their own. By contrast, a rule holding the trustee liable only for
negligent supervision may unnecessarily encourage delegation––the
trustee will actually have less exposure to liability if it delegates than if
it does not. Although reasonable limits on the power to delegate might
mitigate this problem, if courts review decisions to delegate under an
abuse of discretion standard, the incentive to delegate will still exist.75
Second, a strict liability rule would best force trustees who intend
to delegate to negotiate with the settlor for permission, and to craft the
terms of trustee liability.76 This process would highlight issues such as
how delegation of the investment function should affect the trustee’s
compensation, providing clearer guidance for both the trustee and the
beneficiaries in the years to come. Trustees who later raise a trust
provision releasing them from liability for the agent’s acts would have
the burden to show that the settlor possessed full information about the
meaning and existence of the clause. This could be easily accomplished
if the trust provides for a reduced trustee commission in the event of
delegation.
Third, when a trust document fails to authorize the trustee to
delegate the investment function, a rule holding the trustee liable for the
acts of its agent would encourage trustees to seek permission in advance
from trust beneficiaries, reducing beneficiaries’ monitoring costs. This
prior disclosure would also highlight for the beneficiaries the need to
discuss how delegation will affect trustee compensation.
By contrast, a rule holding the trustee liable only if it is negligent
in choosing or monitoring its agents exacerbates the information and
monitoring problems that exist in the professional trustee context. The
rule creates no incentive to bring the delegation issue to the settlor’s
attention during the negotiation process, nor to seek beneficiary
74
75

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. j (1992).
Comments to the Third Restatement draft read that the trustee is not expected to personally
perform the investment decision-making function “even if the trustee is a professional or
institutional fiduciary with competence and experience in financial matters.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
76 Many professional trustees already routinely engage in this practice. See Langbein,
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 109-10, 118.
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approval prior to delegating. The rule leaves it up to the beneficiary to
determine when the trustee has delegated its investment function, and to
take the initiative in getting the trustee to adjust its commission
structure if the trustee fails to do so. Moreover, because the beneficiary
will bear the risk of loss if the agent harms the trust, this rule places
additional unjustified burdens on the beneficiary, not only to monitor
the trustee, but also to monitor the agent.
Although the “negligence” rule creates some incentive to monitor,
it does little to protect the beneficiary if the agent commits a spectacular
one-shot breach, such as appropriating trust funds or committing other
acts of self-dealing.77 Routine monitoring cannot anticipate and prevent
one-shot breaches. Making the trustee personally liable for such
breaches will not generally harm the trustee, because trustees can
continue to draft around the rule,78 and because if they fail to do so, they
have a claim against the breaching agent, assuming that agent is solvent.
So the question boils down to this: who should bear the cost of an
agent’s breach (both litigation costs and the harm to the trust) if the
agent is judgment-proof? The trustee, who chose the agent and can
spread the loss, or the beneficiary, who had nothing to do with the
decision but would bear the full loss by itself? Common sense says that
most settlors would prefer a default rule that imposes liability on the
trustee. In choosing a professional trustee, the settlor is foregoing the
advantage of personal trust administration in favor of the superior
investment and management skills of a professional trustee. It is
unlikely that they would expect the beneficiaries to bear the loss in the
event that the trustee decides to delegate responsibility to a judgmentproof agent.
b.

Delegation and the Non-Professional Trustee

On the other hand, imposing strict liability on the non-professional
trustee when an agent harms the trust is probably not the default rule
most settlors would prefer. When the settlor chooses a family member
or friend whom the settlor knows is inexperienced with investing, it is
reasonable to believe that the settlor expected and would want the
trustee to delegate the investment function to a more qualified person or
entity. In fact, unless the settlor has appointed a professional co-trustee,
the settlor probably expects that the trustee will delegate the investment
function to some degree, even if only by investing in mutual funds.
Delegation allows the beneficiary to benefit from personal trust
77
78

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 103.
Id.
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administration without having to sacrifice the quality of the investment
decisions required to protect and grow trust assets. Not imposing
liability on a non-professional who delegates to an investment agent is
consistent with the spirit of the old non-delegation rule. The trustee
could always delegate tasks that the settlor did not intend for him to
perform personally, and when the delegation is proper, the trustee
would not be liable for acts of an agent reasonably selected and
supervised.79 The modern settlor no more expects a non-professional
trustee to be an investment professional than she expects him to provide
legal services, a delegation that has always been proper.80 Finally,
because the non-professional cannot spread the risk of loss, there is less
reason to think that the settlor would want to the trustee rather than the
trust to absorb the loss.
Moreover, because trustee’s agent will possess a higher level of
expertise than the trustee, the trustee’s abilities to evaluate and monitor
the agent are limited. Most settlors would probably want to impose
liability only if the trustee is negligent in choosing or supervising the
agent. And when the non-professional trustee takes no commission,
beneficiaries will not be harmed if the trustee’s agent charges fees.
2.

Common Law, Common Sense

Although conventional wisdom holds that the common law nondelegation rule was flat wrong, in this Article, I take the controversial
position that the common law was not as far from the mark as it first
appears.
First, although the prohibition against delegating the
investment function ostensibly applied to all trustees, courts rarely
found non-professionals liable for improper delegation if the trustee
used due care in monitoring the agent. Second, the common law rule
holding professional trustees liable for the acts of an investment agent
was correct, but for the wrong reasons.
First, courts often accounted for the status of the trustee in
determining when to impose liability for improper delegation. Prior to
the changes in the non-delegation rule, courts did not routinely impose
liability when a non-professional trustee violated the non-delegation
doctrine by delegating categorically discretionary functions. For
example, in 1943, long before the trend towards permissive delegation
began, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to surcharge an
executor who signed an agency agreement with a bank that allowed the
bank to suggest suitable investments without assuming responsibility
79
80

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 171, 225 (1959).
Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule, supra note 72, at 108.
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for the outcome of the recommendations. The record showed that the
executor did in fact delegate more than just ministerial tasks. The court,
however, emphasizing the executor’s diligent review of the bank’s
actions, and approval of transactions, refused to surcharge the executor
for breach.81
On the other hand, courts imposed liability on non-professional
trustees when the trustee blatantly failed to supervise the activities of
the agent and the trustee’s prolonged negligence exacerbated the trust’s
losses. For example, in Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children v.
Gardiner, a case often cited for the proposition that delegation of
investment authority is improper, the trustee simply turned over all
investment decisions to an embezzling stockbroker. Although the court
cited the non-delegation rule as justification for its decision, the court
also emphasized that the trustee provided absolutely no supervision and
took no care to monitor or review the acts of the agent.82 In short, the
case law does not reveal heavy-handed imposition of strict liability
against non-professional trustees who delegated and diligently
monitored in good faith. Instead, the case law appears to be reasonably
consistent with the current delegation rule.
Second, cases imposing liability on professional trustees for the
acts of their investment agents reach the correct result, for perhaps the
wrong reasons. Although a rule permitting appropriate delegation is
certainly the better approach, at least today, it does not follow that the
trustee’s fiduciary duties should be reduced simply by the unilateral
decision to delegate. The end result of the old rule, which is that
trustees were liable for breaches of duty by the investment agent, is
sound.
3.

Statutory Shortcomings

81 In re Kohler’s Estate, 33 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1943); see also In re Quinlan’s Estate, 273 A.2d
340 (Pa. 1971) (finding non-professional executor who improperly delegated to bank the power to
negotiate sale of trust-owned business should not be removed as trustee because he acted in good
faith and on advice of counsel).
82 Shriners Hosps. For Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1110 (Ariz. 1987); see also
Gaines v. Dahlin, 154 So. 101 (Ala. 1934) (voiding agreement between trustee and bank because
it conferred absolute discretion on bank to invest, and prohibited trustee from interfering for ten
years); In re Will of Hartzell, 192 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1963) (finding trustee in breach for
allowing embezzling attorney to hold funds from sale of trust property without inquiry and
without ever requiring an accounting); In re Will of Jones, 765 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sur. Ct. 2003)
(declining to approve power of attorney by trustee to co-trustee, since it would result in
delegation without supervision); Abrams v. U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co., 106 N.W. 1091 (Wis.
1906) (holding guardian liable for losses for failing to supervise embezzling attorney who
collected, retained, and invested insurance proceeds for orphaned children).
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Both the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the UTC provide that
1) trustees’ delegation authority varies depending on the identity of the
trustee and the purpose of the trust and 2) the trustee’s agent owes
fiduciary duties to the trust, but that 3) if the trustee’s agent causes the
trust harm, the trustee is personally liable only if the trustee acted
negligently in selecting, directing, or monitoring the agent.83 The
drafters appropriately considered the differences between professional
and non-professional trustees in terms of the scope of permissible
delegation. Yet the rule’s liability provisions could have been better
crafted to account for this difference. The provisions concerning the
trustee’s liability to the trust for the agent’s acts are best suited to the
case of the non-professional trustee. As applied to professional trustees,
however, the statute could create a better incentive structure.
In explaining the decision to hold trustees liable for their agents’
acts only on a showing that the trustee was negligent, the drafters
acknowledge that there is “an intrinsic tension” between “granting
trustees broad powers that facilitate flexible and efficient trust
administration, on the one hand, and protecting trust beneficiaries from
the misuse of such powers on the other hand.”84 Ultimately, however,
they determine that imposing on the trustee duties of “care, skill and
caution” in delegating, and imposing fiduciary duties directly on the
agent, provides sufficient protection for the beneficiary.85 Nowhere do
83

UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994) provides:
(a) A trustee may delegate investment and management functions that a prudent
trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The
trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
(1) selecting an agent;
(2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the
purposes and terms of the trust; and
(3) periodically reviewing the agent’s actions in order to monitor the agent’s
performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.
(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise
reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
(c) A trustee who complies with the requirements of subsection (a) is not liable to the
beneficiaries or to the trust for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the
function was delegated.
84 Id. at § 9 cmt.
85 The comment to section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act states:
There is an intrinsic tension in trust law between granting trustees broad powers that
facilitate flexible and efficient trust administration, on the one hand, and protecting
trust beneficiaries from the misuse of such powers on the other hand. . . . If the trustee
delegates effectively, the beneficiaries obtain the advantage of the agent’s specialized
investment skills or whatever other attributes induced the trustee to delegate. But if the
trustee delegates to a knave or an incompetent, the delegation can work harm upon the
beneficiaries.
Section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act is designed to strike the
appropriate balance between the advantages and the hazards of delegation. . . . Section
9(a) imposes duties of care, skill, and caution on the trustee in selecting the agent, in
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they make the case that the beneficiary, rather than the trustee, should
bear the risk of loss of an insolvent agent.
The drafters also recognize that allowing broad delegation powers
may create costs for the beneficiaries. As they state,
the trustee must be alert to protect the beneficiary from “double
dipping.” If, for example, the trustee’s regular compensation
schedule presupposes that the trustee will conduct the investment
management function, it should ordinarily follow that the trustee will
lower its fee when delegating the investment function to an outside
manager.

Thus, they opt for a rule that places all of the monitoring costs on the
beneficiaries, and that leaves decisions about the trustee’s proper
compensation to the integrity of the trustee.
III. MODIFYING FIDUCIARY RULES
A.

Different Standards for Different Trustees

We have seen that the identity of the trustee is an important factor
in determining how courts apply fiduciary standards. It also plays an
important role when courts confront various conflicts arising from a
second issue: to what extent are fiduciary standards modifiable by the
parties to the trust document? In recent years it has become fashionable
to describe fiduciary standards as “default rules” around which the
parties can freely draft. However, to equate fiduciary rules with true
default rules, such as those found in the UTC, would be an error.86
Even scholars and the drafters of the UTC who have embraced the
“default rule” rhetoric admit that there are, and should be, some limits
on parties’ ability to waive or modify the rules.87 To date, they have
establishing the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing the agent’s compliance. The
trustee’s duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the terms of the delegation should
protect the beneficiary against overbroad delegation.
Id. The comment also states:
Although subsection (c) of the Act exonerates the trustee from personal responsibility
for the agent’s conduct when the delegation satisfies the standards of subsection 9(a),
subsection 9(b) makes the agent responsible to the trust. The beneficiaries of the trust
can, therefore, rely upon the trustee to enforce the terms of the delegation.
Id.
86 See generally Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2.
87 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1105, 1111-17; 1121-25 (2004). Langbein acknowledges the need for a narrow mandatory
regime to deal with potential trustee fraud, id. at 1124-25, and suggests that policies against
perpetuating inefficient dead-hand control might justify a court’s refusal to enforce a settlor’s
directive to concentrate trust investments in only one asset (a waiver of the duty to diversify). Id.
at 1111-17. He also suggests that concern for effectuation of settlors’ intent justifies Uniform
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offered no theoretical justification for limiting fiduciary duties at all. In
a recent article, I have offered a theoretical framework for determining
whether and to what extent particular fiduciary rules can be modified.88
In the following paragraphs, I draw on that theory to explore how the
identity of the trustee should be a factor in evaluating the extent to
which fiduciary rules can be modified.
I argue in the following paragraphs that the asymmetrical
information problem and concerns for settlors’ intent justify treating the
modification issue differently depending on the trustee’s identity. I
conclude that there is little justification for allowing professional
trustees to hide behind broad protective waivers, but that such waivers
are more justifiable when the trustee is a non-professional, and that the
majority of courts understand this. Transaction-specific waivers are less
problematic, although courts rightly construe them more strictly against
professional trustees.
Finally, I submit that certain statutory
developments over the last twenty years create default rules for
institutional trustees that lack the wisdom of the common law and create
risks for all beneficiaries.
1.

Professional Trustees

Parties’ attempts to modify fiduciary standards can take various
forms. Some trust provisions are broadly worded attempts to decrease
fiduciary standards. An example would be a provision that exculpates
the trustee from liability for loss stemming from the trustee’s acts,
except for acts taken in bad faith or with reckless disregard for the
beneficiaries’ interests (hereinafter, I will call these types of nonspecific waivers “broad waivers”). Other modifications are carefully
limited and transaction-specific; for example, a settlor may transfer into
trust shares of stock in a corporation in which the trustee has an interest
and relieve the trustee from the no further inquiry rule with respect to
those investments. Or, the settlor may have an undiversified portfolio
consisting of stock in the settlor’s closely owned family business and
may absolve the trustee from liability for failing to diversify, or from
liability for loss in value of the stock (hereinafter, “transaction-specific
waivers”).
As we have seen, when the settlor engages a professional trustee,
the negotiation process is often characterized by stark information
asymmetries. Because a trust provision reducing fiduciary duties or
Trust Code provisions that do not allow a settlor to waive trustee’s duty to act in good faith, or to
waive all of the trustee’s fiduciary duties. Id. at 1121-25.
88 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 2.
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exculpating the trustee is inconsistent with the premise of the
relationship, settlors who are not well counseled are unlikely to spot it,
or if they spot it, to understand its likely effect.
In determining what the limits on a professional trustee’s ability to
modify fiduciary protections should be, one thing is clear: there are few,
if any, good reasons for a settlor to agree to a broad exculpatory clause
that dramatically raises a professional trustee’s threshold of liability.
The essence of the transaction is the settlor’s desire to retain an expert
level of service for his beneficiaries. Nor would a settlor have much
reason to authorize the trustee to profit from its position without
advance approval. Generally, then, broad waivers are inconsistent with
settlors’ desire to retain professional management. Often, the very
existence of a broad exculpatory clause in a trust document may be
evidence that the parties had unequal access to information during the
negotiation process.89
When a professional trustee insists on a broad waiver, a fully
informed settlor might have three possible motivations for agreeing.90
For the first two, a broad waiver is a sub-optimal solution, a fact that the
settlor’s attorney would presumably explain. First, believing that a
particular beneficiary is unstable or unduly litigious might lead a settlor
to reduce that beneficiary’s incentive to litigate by absolving the trustee
of liability for negligent management. Reducing the level of care that
the trustee owes to all beneficiaries is a less appealing solution than
carefully limiting the trustee’s discretion to make distributions to that
beneficiary, or alternatively, including a carefully drafted clause
imposing consequences for frivolous litigation on particular
beneficiaries. Second, a trustee might insist on a limitation on trustee
liability as a condition to taking on certain investments, an insufficiently
diversified portfolio, or investments in which the trustee has an interest.
Here again, a transaction-specific modification authorizing the
investments and protecting the trustee from liability only for losses
stemming from those specific investments is the best solution.
Third, a settlor might (conceivably) agree to a reduced standard of
care, or authorize the fiduciary to profit from its position, because a
professional trustee insists upon it. An informed settlor presumably
would seek something in exchange, such as lower trustee fees. In these
presumably rare instances, enforcement of a broad waiver would be
proper only if the trustee presented clear evidence that the settlor had
full information concerning the meaning and likely effect of the
clause.91 The best evidence, of course, would be evidence that the
89
90
91

Id. at 100-04.
For a fuller analysis of this topic, see id. at 101-04.
Id.

2006]

COMMON LAW, COMMON SENSE

2745

trustee offered the settlor two prices for two different services: one
commission for full-service trusteeship, and a lower commission for an
agreement that includes an exculpatory clause lowering the standard of
care or authorizing trustee self-dealing.92 Placing the burden on the
trustee would create a disincentive for reflexive use of broad waivers,
would force disclosure during bargaining when the trustee believes that
a clause is necessary, and would induce the settlor to obtain independent
advice about the meaning of the clause.
On the other hand, transaction-specific waivers, such as a clause
that authorizes the trustee to hold a particular investment in trust, and
exculpates the trustee for loss if that investment loses value, are more
likely than broad waivers to be the product of negotiation. Because
these narrow clauses raise less concern about information problems,
courts should be more willing to enforce them.
Thus, the optimal rule for professional trustees will force full
disclosure during the negotiation process.93
Absent clear and
convincing evidence of full disclosure, broad waivers of entire duties
(such as the duty of care) almost never should be enforced.
Note that this rule is not necessary to protect the majority of
settlors, who will have attorneys who bargain strenuously to protect
them. Very high net worth individuals, who often have attorneys who
look out for their interests generally, and other settlors who have
capable counsel will not need the benefit of this approach because
counsel will insist that they agree to a broad waiver only in the rare
circumstances where such a clause advances their best interests. The
rule is necessary for those who are either unrepresented or inadequately
represented.
2.

Non-Professional Trustees

The asymmetrical information problem is less likely to exist when
the settlor chooses as trustee a non-professional associate or family
member. In this situation, the settlor chooses the trustee because the
trustee has a relationship with the settlor and the objects of the settlor’s
bounty, and can be trusted to make discretionary decisions about the
beneficiaries’ respective needs. Individual trustees of this sort are
unlikely to be trustees of other trusts, are less likely to participate in
drafting the trust’s terms, and are likely to be on a level playing field
92 See Coffee, supra note 5, at 1623 (stating that “courts should uphold opt-out provisions
that deviate from traditional fiduciary standards only when they can find that the term has been
accurately priced”); see also id. at 1666-68 (discussing difficulties with accurate pricing).
93 See Sitkoff, supra note 15.
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with the settlor in terms of sophistication. When the settlor chooses a
non-professional trustee, therefore, information problems are unlikely to
be significant.
When a broad waiver is contained in a trust document that names a
non-professional trustee, it should be less cause for concern. There are
good reasons for settlors to immunize non-professionals from liability
for actions taken in good faith. When the settlor chooses the trustee
because he trusts her to provide the best care for family members and
make responsible distribution choices, that trust, and not an expectation
of expert investment skills, may be the essence of the relationship. The
settlor may wish to immunize her for good faith mistakes, especially
when she is not getting compensated. Reducing the liability standard
may also be necessary to induce a non-professional to perform the role.
Because information asymmetries are unlikely to be a significant
problem in most cases, even broad waivers should be enforced. Given
that information problems are less serious and the need for exculpation
is greater, it is important to give settlors and their non-professional
trustees more leeway to draft around fiduciary rules in order to
effectuate the settlor’s purpose. Courts interpreting waivers in these
trusts should approach the issue as though they were interpreting a
contract.
B.

Common Law, Common Sense

Conventional wisdom holds that courts generally enforce
exculpatory clauses in trust documents regardless of the trustee’s
identity.94 Although courts occasionally do seem to reflexively honor
these clauses,95 the vast majority of courts do not take such a cavalier
approach when a professional trustee attempts to avoid liability by
invoking a broad waiver. For starters, a few state courts have flatly
refused to uphold broad exculpatory clauses to protect professional
trustees from liability when they have acted negligently.96 Some judges
94
95
96

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222, reporter’s notes (1959).
See, e.g., Warren v. Pazolt, 89 N.E. 381 (Mass. 1909).
New Jersey courts have determined that, as a general matter, an exculpatory clause cannot
relieve a trustee from liability “where a loss results from negligence in the administration of a
trust.” Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1953) (citing Liberty Title &
Trust Co. v. Plews, 60 A.2d 630 (N.J. Ch. 1948)); see Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 53 A.2d
225 (N.J. Ch. 1947), aff’d, 64 A.2d 214 (N.J. 1949); see also Semler v. Corestates Bank, 693
A.2d 1198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding the trustee liable for negligence on the
ground that the trustee’s negligent acts fell outside the scope of protection the exculpatory clause
provided). The Alabama Supreme Court has held that “although a trustee’s duties and obligations
are governed largely by the trust agreement, that agreement cannot be employed to vitiate ‘the
duty imposed by the ‘prudent person’ standard.’” First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins,
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have taken more extreme action: in the 1930s, New York Surrogates
drafted and advocated for a statute,97 still on the books, that codified the
Surrogates’ view that exculpatory clauses in testamentary trusts violate
public policy.98 Legislative history suggests the Surrogates believed
that professional trust companies were routinely including boilerplate
exculpatory clauses in trust instruments, that settlors did not understand
the meaning of the provisions,99 and that settlors’ attorneys failed to
protect their clients’ interests in an effort to obtain repeat business from
the trust companies.100 Other courts, while not going so far as to
515 So. 2d 962, 964 (Ala. 1987) (holding that a trust provision cannot alter the trustee’s duty to
use reasonable care in making and managing investments).
97 According to a letter written by Surrogate Wingate to Governor Lehman, the bill was
drafted by Surrogates Wingate, Foley, and Delehanty. The Surrogate’s Association of New York
State approved the bill. Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H.
Lehman (Apr. 1, 1936) (on file with The Association of the Bar of the City of New York library).
98 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-1.7 (McKinney 1967). That section provides: “(a)
The attempted grant to an executor or testamentary trustee, or the successor of either, of any of
the following enumerated powers or immunities is contrary to public policy: (1) The exoneration
of such fiduciary from liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence and prudence.”
Id.
99 Surrogate Wingate argued that:
the chief vice [with exculpatory clauses] arises from the fact that the average testator
neither sees nor understands these clauses nor the effect that they may produce among
his dependents. He is primarily concerned with the fact that certain dependents are to
receive, as he believes, certain portions of his property, and is content to leave to the
attorney drawing the will the administrative portions thereof.
Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman, supra note 96. In
another letter, Surrogate Wingate argued that the testator in the vast majority of cases had not
“any remote realization of the fact that he was subjecting the property upon which his dependents
must look for support, to potentially serious jeopardy.” Letter from Surrogate George Albert
Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman (Apr. 21, 1936) (on file with the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York library); see also REP. No. 6.11A, Leg. Doc. (1965) No. 19, pp. 499-501
(quoting legislative history establishing that the purpose of the statute was “to protect testators
and the objects of their bounty from the untoward effects of ingeniously contrived clauses, the
full legal consequences of which are seldom appreciated at the time of the execution of the wills
containing them”).
100 As one Surrogate put it:
the drawing of wills . . . has to perhaps a preponderant extent fallen into the hands of
lawyers who are either actively engaged in work for these financial institutions or
hopefully anticipate such retainers. As a result, men who are more and more coming to
do the work of testamentary draftsmanship, have come to view the wills they are called
upon to draw from the standpoint of the corporate fiduciaries whom they expect to
represent, rather than from that of the testator and the persons, whether dependents or
otherwise, whom he desires to benefit.
Letter from Surrogate George Albert Wingate to Governor Herbert H. Lehman, supra note 98.
Surrogate Wingate further argued that
these corporate fiduciaries in too many instances view the entire matter [of drafting a
will with a testamentary trust provision] not so much as a sacred trust upon which the
welfare of the beneficiaries, and indeed, at times, their very existence depends, as just
another piece of business to be handled in a routine way, frequently by underpaid
clerks, lacking both experience and sound judgment.
Id.
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expressly prohibit broad waivers, construe them very narrowly against
professional trustees, imposing liability on the ground that the trustee’s
conduct falls outside the scope of the clause’s protection.101 When
creative trustees have argued that broad waivers relieving them of
liability for acts taken in good faith permit them to self-deal, courts have
rejected the argument.
Moreover, the cases most often cited to support the proposition that
exculpatory clauses are enforceable do not, when read carefully, support
that generalization. In fact, a more accurate reading of the case law is
that courts “uphold” exculpatory clauses and shield trustees from
liability if the case falls into at least one of the following categories:
1) the trustee was not in fact negligent at all;102
2) the “trust” is not a prototypical private express trust, but part
of an arm’s length business arrangement;103
3) the modification was a carefully drawn, transaction-specific
modification of the trustee’s fiduciary duty and the conduct
complained of fell squarely within the clause’s protection;104
101 See McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002) (considering a trust provision that
protected trustee from liability for negligence, and concluding that trustee was liable for breach of
trust because “[a] reasonable construction of these provisions . . . is that the Lois Trustees were
exculpated for ordinary negligence, but not the duty to (i) inform beneficiaries or (ii) treat them
impartially”); In re Williams’ Trust, 591 N.W.2d 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding validity
of exculpatory clause shielding trustees from liability from errors in judgment, but finding that
trustee’s failure to sell declining stock for over four years, even though stock comprised majority
of trust’s assets, could constitute a breach of fiduciary duty because failure was not “an error in
judgment” but might amount to “negligence”); Behrman, 95 A.2d 599 at 601 (citing Liberty Title
& Trust, 60 A.2d 630); Villard v. Villard, 219 N.Y. 482 (1916) (holding that clause purporting to
shield trustee from liability for retaining investments originally held by settlor did not shield him
from liability for failing to sell investments that it did not know were not part of settlor’s estate);
Bauer v. Barernschmidt, 187 A.D.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that exculpatory clause
did not protect trustee from liability for making certain negligent expenditures); In re Rushmore’s
Estate, 21 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sur. Ct. 1940) (holding that an exculpatory clause directing that trustee
would not be held liable “for any act done . . . in good faith hereunder” did not shield trustee from
liability for “non-legal” investments); Jewett v. Capital Nat’l Bank of Austin, 618 S.W.2d 109
(Tex. App. 1981) (holding that an exculpatory clause relieving trustee of liability for investing in
speculative stocks did not shield the trustee from liability for negligence in failing to diversify the
trust’s assets).
102 See, e.g., Kimball v. New England Trust Co., 14 Conn. Supp. 432 (Super. Ct. 1947);
Powell v. Cocowitch, 94 So. 2d 589, 591-92 (Fla. 1957); In re Nuese’s Estate, 96 A.2d 298 (N.J.
1953); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 71 A.2d 184 (N.J. 1950); In re Clark’s Will, 177 N.E. 397
(N.Y. 1931); In re Cowles’ Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 160, 172-73 (App. Div. 1965); Matter of City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 61 N.Y.S.2d 484 (App. Div. 1946); Spring v. Hawkes, 41 A.2d 538 (Pa.
1945).
103 See, e.g., Gardner v. Squire, 49 N.E.2d 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942).
104 See, e.g., Perling v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 300 S.E.2d 649 (Ga. 1983); Bartlett v.
Dumaine, 523 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 1986) (upholding exculpatory clause because “Dumaines ‘is a
unique trust, having features of both a trust and a corporation,’ and . . . ‘[s]ince the Dumaines
Trustees are to establish and carry on businesses, the settlor clearly intended that the ‘prudent
[person] rule’ of investment would not be applicable’”); Farr v. First Camden Nat’l Bank & Trust
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4) the settlor or beneficiary gave advance approval for the
trustee’s acts;105 or
5) the trustee was a non-professional.106
In short, most courts intuitively understand the asymmetrical
information problem, and allow professional trustees to hide behind
exculpatory clauses only if there is evidence that the settlor had full
information, the trustee obtained advance approval, or the trustee is a
non-professional. But understanding courts’ approach requires a careful
reading of the case law and a willingness to disregard blanket
statements found in treatises. Because the message of the case law may
be murky, a clearly drafted statute could go a long way in clarifying the
rule. This would create additional incentives for professional trustees to
make full disclosure about any exculpatory provisions they wish to
insert in the trust documents.
Similarly, another creature of the common law works to ensure that
professional trustees make full disclosure before they act in a way that
is inconsistent with fiduciary duties—the no further inquiry rule. By
imposing strict liability for self-dealing without advance approval, the
rule creates the strongest possible incentives to make full disclosure.
Courts’ approach to the duty of care and the duty of loyalty make
eminent sense.
C.

Statutory Shortcomings

The UTC sets some limits on the parties’ ability to modify or
eliminate fiduciary rules. Yet the relevant Code provisions, read
together with the comments, fail to take sufficient account of the
differences between professional and non-professional trustees.
The UTC begins by emphasizing that it is largely comprised of
default rules. With respect to fiduciary duties, the Code sets limits on
the parties’ abilities to waive or modify fiduciary standards. Section
105(b)(2) and (3) dictate that the parties may not waive “the duty of the
trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the
trust” nor “the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of
the beneficiaries.”107 Taking a cue from the Second Restatement,108
Co., 66 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949); In re Cowles’ Will, 22 A.D.2d 365, 378 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1965); Hoffman v. First Va. Bank, 263 S.E.2d 402 (Va. 1980).
105 In re Leupp, 153 A. 842 (N.J. Ch. 1931).
106 See Pearson v. Barr, No. D037414, 2002 WL 1970144 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2002);
Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56 (1883); In re Mallon’s Estate, 89 N.Y.S. 554 (Sur. Ct. 1904);
Biddulph v. Delorenzo, No. 83808, 2004 WL 1902725 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004).
107 The Comments explain:
Subsection (b)(2) provides that the terms may not eliminate a trustee’s duty to act in
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section 1008 of the UTC provides that an exculpatory clause relieving
the trustee from liability for breach of fiduciary duty is enforceable,
except to the extent it relieves the trustee of liability for acts taken in
bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust.109
Thus, the Code gives the parties wide latitude to modify or
eliminate trustees’ fiduciary duties. For example, it is clear that the
parties can relieve the trustee from liability for negligence. Taken
literally, the Code also allows the parties to authorize the trustee to
profit indiscriminately from its position of trust, as long as the trust
profits as well. The drafters do not explain why they place any limits on
the parties’ ability to contract, nor do they explain why they draw the
lines where they do. Perhaps they were cognizant of information
good faith and in accordance with the purposes of the trust. Subsection (b)(3) provides
that the terms may not eliminate the requirement that a trust and its terms must be for
the benefit of the beneficiaries. Subsection (b)(2)-(3) are echoed in Sections 404 (trust
and its terms must be for benefit of beneficiaries), 801 (trustee must administer trust in
good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the
beneficiaries), 814 (trustee must exercise discretionary power in good faith and in
accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries), and 1008
(exculpatory term unenforceable to extent it relieves trustee of liability for breach of
trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. (2005).
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959) (stating that although strictly construed,
exculpatory provisions, absent an abuse in insertion into the trust instrument, relieve the trustee of
liability for breach of trust unless the breach is committed in “bad faith, or intentionally or with
reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary”). Yet the fact is that most states do not
have a rule in place that actually results in shielding trustees from liability for gross negligence.
California and states that have followed its lead have expressly rejected the Restatement
formulation, prohibiting by statute exculpatory clauses that purport to relieve the trustee for
liability from gross negligence. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 16461(b) (West 2003) (providing
that an exculpatory clause in a trust document “is not effective to relieve the trustee of liability (1)
for breach of trust committed intentionally, with gross negligence, in bad faith, or with reckless
indifference to the interest of the beneficiary, or (2) for any profit that the trustee derives from a
breach of trust”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-512 (2003) (same as California but omitting bad
faith). The Official Comments to section 16461(b) of the California Probate Code state: “This
section is the same in substance as part of Section 222 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
(1957), except that the reference to gross negligence does not appear in the Restatement.” CAL.
PROB. CODE § 16461(b) cmt. (West 2003).
109 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 (2005) provides:
(a) A term of a trust relieving a trustee of liability for breach of trust is unenforceable
to the extent that it:
(1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or
with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the
beneficiaries; or
(2) was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship to the settlor.
(b) An exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the trustee is invalid as an
abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves that the
exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents
were adequately communicated to the settlor.
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problems; it seems certain that no informed settlor would agree to trust
terms that authorize reckless, bad faith behavior, or that allow the
trustee to plunder the trust assets at will. If information asymmetries
justify placing limits on the parties’ freedom to contract, though, why
prohibit only the most egregious forms of opportunistic behavior?
Sufficient attention to differences between professional and nonprofessional trustees in the trust formation process helps determine
where the lines should be drawn.
On its face, section 1008 of the UTC is a fairly sensible approach
to the exculpatory clause problem for both professional and nonprofessional trustees. The model statute wisely takes steps to remedy
information problems: in addition to placing some limits on the
permissible scope of waivers,110 it places the burden to prove that the
settlor was informed of the exculpatory clause squarely on the trustee
who inserts it. The trustee must prove both that the clause was “fair”
and that the clause’s “existence and contents were adequately
communicated to the settlor.” Nothing in the language requires courts
to abandon their traditional approach to broad exculpatory clauses. In
applying this statute, most courts would likely enforce limited,
transaction-specific waivers, as well as broad waivers drafted to protect
non-professionals. Professionals who seek to avoid liability by
invoking broad waivers would have the burden to prove that they made
full disclosure to the settlor.
The Code’s comments would be the ideal place to emphasize the
difference in treatment of professional and non-professional trustees,
and to reinforce the approach that a majority of courts have taken to the
problem. Instead, the comments suffer from a failure to take into
account the differences between the professional and non-professional
settings. In so doing, they gut the protections provided for by the
Code’s black letter, at least with respect to professional trustees.
Specifically, the comments provide a safe harbor for trustees who
deal with settlors represented by counsel.111 The comments create two
conclusive presumptions about the settlor who was represented by
counsel. The first states that the settlor’s attorney shall be presumed to
be the trust instrument’s drafter, even if the trustee supplied the trust
110 See Langbein, supra note 85, at 1124 (acknowledging that a waiver of trustee’s duty to act
in good faith “must have been improperly concealed from the settlor or otherwise misunderstood
by the settlor when propounded”).
111 Section 1008(b) provides that “[a]n exculpatory term drafted or caused to be drafted by the
trustee is invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee proves
that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances and that its existence and contents were
adequately communicated to the settlor.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (2005). The comments to
subsection (b) indicate that it was intended to disapprove of Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which validated an exculpatory clause that was drafted by the settlor’s
attorney, who was also named as a trustee. Id. at § 1008 cmt.
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document form.112 If taken seriously, this would mean that courts can
no longer strictly construe the waiver against the professional trustee,
since that professional can no longer be viewed as “the drafter.” More
troubling, the second conclusive presumption is that the represented
settlor had full information regarding the existence and meaning of any
exculpatory provision.113 The comments also provide that the settlor’s
lawyer’s knowledge of the clause shall be imputed to the settlor,
regardless of whether the attorney actually informed the settlor about
the clause.114 Thus, the settlor represented by inadequate counsel is
afforded absolutely no protection from overreaching by a professional
trustee.
This “safe harbor” makes sense when viewed from the perspective
of the non-professional trustee. Because exculpatory clauses are
generally wealth-enhancing for the settlor, and because information
asymmetries are unlikely to be significant in this context, it makes sense
to allow non-professional trustees to rely on the bargained-for waiver.
The “safe harbor” makes no sense, however, for professional trustees, at
least from the settlor’s perspective. Responsible trustees and attorneys
do not need the benefit of a statute that imputes knowledge to their
clients, because they will ensure that clients have actual knowledge and
a fair understanding of any non-standard trust terms. The statutory
provision benefits only those attorneys who violate ethical obligations,
such as those who subordinate their clients’ best interests to curry favor
with institutional trustees.
The comments would do better to reinforce the disclosureencouraging approach that the common law takes. The comments
should distinguish between professional and non-professional trustees,
suggest that broad exculpatory clauses rarely should be used by
professionals, and provide that, if such clauses are used, the professional
trustee has the burden to prove full disclosure and consent regardless of
whether the settlor was represented by counsel.
CONCLUSION

112

The comments to section 1008 state that:
The requirements of subsection (b) are satisfied if the settlor was represented by
independent counsel. If the settlor was represented by independent counsel, the
settlor’s attorney is considered the drafter of the instrument even if the attorney used
the trustee’s form. Because the settlor’s attorney is an agent of the settlor, disclosure
of an exculpatory term to the settlor’s attorney is disclosure to the settlor.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008 cmt. (2005).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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There are sound reasons to have separate fiduciary standards for
non-professional and professional trustees.
Courts intuitively
understand this, and have developed fact-specific standards to take
account of the particular difficulties that non-professional trustees face.
The argument that classic fiduciary rules should be weakened to protect
the non-professional should be rejected; generally, courts offer adequate
protection to non-professionals. Traditional fiduciary rules, such as the
no further inquiry rule and the prohibition against delegation of the
investment function, grew organically from the need to compensate for
information asymmetries and market imperfections in the trust context.
Because the UTC and other statutes gut those strict standards, they will
generate serious costs for beneficiaries in the coming years. To the
extent those statutes suggest that courts ought to abandon the sensible
common law approach to fiduciary duty issues, they are severely
misguided.

